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Abstract
Consider a subjective expected utility preference relation. It is usually
held that the representations which this relation admits differ only in
one respect, namely, the possible scales for the measurement of utility.
In this paper, I discuss the fact that there are, metaphorically speak-
ing, two additional dimensions along which infinitely many more ad-
missible representations can be found. The first additional dimension
is that of state-dependence. The second—and, in this context, much
lesser-known—additional dimension is that of act-dependence. The
simplest implication of their usually neglected existence is that the
standard axiomatizations of subjective expected utility fail to provide
the measurement of subjective probability with satisfactory behavioral
foundations.
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Introduction
In this paper, I discuss Savage’s axiomatization of subjective expected util-
ity (Savage, 1954; 1972). I will assume without discussion that the main
function of this representation theorem is to provide behavioral foundations
for subjective probability measures—e.g., the statisticians’ priors appearing
in Bayesian statistics. Throughout, I refer to Savage merely because his re-
sult is the prime example of its kind in decision theory; mutatis mutandis,
all of the following applies to Ramsey, de Finetti, Anscombe and Aumann,
and anyone in the business of “explicat[ing] [beliefs] in the language of bets”
(Seidenfeld et al., 1990b, p. 523).
I will be concerned here exclusively with the uniqueness clause of Sav-
age’s theorem. Accordingly, unless stated otherwise, I will assume throughout
the paper that the existence conditions of Savage’s representation, i.e., the
Savage axioms, are satisfied. Sticking to Savage’s own terminology, this as-
sumption can be expressed as follows. Let < denote the binary preference
of a decision-maker over a set F of acts, with ∼ and  denoting indifference
and strict preference, respectively. The set F has the structure F ≡ XS
with S, the set of all possible states of nature and X, the set of all possible
consequences of the decision-maker’s acts. Although the Savage theorem fa-
mously requires S to be infinite, throughout this paper, I will discuss it as if
it allowed for a finite S, with S = {s1, . . . , sn}, and I will take the maximal
algebra of events 2S . This is to simplify exposition and, for discussing the
uniqueness of the representation, without loss of generality.1 Accordingly,
within this paper, I will say that < satisfies the Savage axioms if and only
if there exists a (non-constant) utility function u : X → R and a probability
1Besides, although the Savage theorem can be invoked only when S is infinite, reason-
ably close variants of this theorem can be invoked when S is finite (see, e.g., Köbberling
and Wakker, 2003 and the references therein). In these variants, unlike in the Savage the-
orem, instead of being imposed on S, richness requirements are typically imposed on X.
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measure p : 2S → R such that, for any f and g ∈ F , (1) holds:















The standard uniqueness clause of the Savage theorem is that in (1), p is
absolutely unique and u is unique up to an increasing affine transformation,
i.e., u can be replaced by v if and only if v = au+ b, for some a ∈ R>0, b ∈ R.
What is said in the standard uniqueness clause of the Savage theorem is,
of course, correct; but it is also significantly incomplete. As I will explain
and discuss, there are—metaphorically speaking—two additional dimensions
along which infinitely many other admissible representations of < can be
found and across which the uniqueness of p, in particular, will be lost. The
first additional dimension is that of state-dependence. The second additional
dimension is that of act-dependence and it is by far, in the present state of
the literature, the less familiar of the two dimensions. The most important
fact in what follows will be that preferences satisfying the Savage axioms
are compatible not only with the kind of representation given in (1), i.e., a
state-independent and act-independent representation, but also with an in-
finity of alternative state-dependent and/or act-dependent representations.
One major implication will be that the Savage theorem—once again: taken
as the prime example of its kind in decision theory—fails to provide sub-
jective probability measures with compelling behavioral foundations. I will
be concerned here almost exclusively with mathematically establishing the
above fact, because it is only incompletely understood in the current liter-
ature. Although this fact is of clear philosophical significance, I will not be
able to elaborate here on the conceptual or the methodological implications.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 examines state-dependence.
This dimension is now relatively well understood in the literature, thanks
in particular to classic work by Teddy Seidenfeld and co-authors (Seidenfeld
et al., 1990b; Schervish et al., 1990; 2013). I will only need to repeat their
2
statement of the main problem, with two minor clarifications which I will
contribute. Section 2 examines act-dependence. This dimension is currently
not well known. To explore act-dependence and understand the symmetries
or asymmetries with state-dependence, I will build on recent work by David
Dillenberger and co-authors (Dillenberger et al., 2017). Their work will en-
able me to offer novel insights on act-dependence. A brief conclusion ensues.
1 State-Dependence
Consider a preference relation representable as in (1). For simplicity, assume,
to start with, that p in (1) has full support over S, i.e., p gives strictly positive


































Therefore, with < the same preference relation as in (1), we have that, for
any f and g ∈ F , (3) holds:















The key point in (2) is that the vi correspond to state-dependent increas-
ing affine transformations of u from (1), and that such transformations,
too, prove compatible with the respect of the Savage axioms—including P3
and P4, i.e., the axioms supposed to enforce state-independence in the Savage
axiomatics.2 Indeed, if q is coupled with the collection of vi as constructed
2In general, seeing u as a function from X to R|S|, a state-dependent increasing affine
transformation is of the form αu+ β, with α ∈ R|S|>0 and β ∈ R|S|. For simplicity, we here
take β = 0 and a suitably restricted domain for α; but the problem applies more generally,
with an order-preserving renormalization. Notice the parallel with the case of cardinal non-
comparable utilities in social choice theory (e.g., d’Aspremont and Gevers, 2002, p. 485).
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above, then, not only will their composition respect the Savage axioms; it
will also be behaviorally indistinguishable from the product of the functions p
and u initially given in (1). To this extent, Savage’s approach cannot dis-
tinguish between p and q or, indeed, any pair of full support priors. Notice
in particular that, following (2), one could associate any preference relation
representable as in (1) with the same prior—say, the uniform prior over S.
Accordingly, although, by assumption, their behavior differs, all the Savage
decision-makers can be shown to share the same prior. This vividly illustrates
the failure of the Savage theorem—once again: taken as the prime example
of its kind in decision theory—to provide subjective probability measures
with compelling behavioral foundations.
The argument just sketched is now standard in the literature, thanks
to its being stressed by many over the years, and particularly forcefully
by Teddy Seidenfeld and co-authors (see Seidenfeld et al., 1990b, p. 521;
Schervish et al., 1990, p. 840, 2013, p. 508; see also, most importantly and
in order of historical precedence, Drèze, 1961, Savage and Aumann, 1987,
Arrow, 1974, and Karni, 1996). However, I would like to add two minor
qualifications to the way Teddy Seidenfeld and co-authors typically present
the issue. This is not to criticize these authors, whom I take to be aware of
the necessary qualifications; this is merely to help their readers in directly
appreciating the full extent of the problem.
First, I want to dispel the impression according to which, in (1), there
is a substantial asymmetry between the states to which the Savage distribu-
tion p gives probability value zero and the states to which it gives a strictly
positive probability value. Following Savage’s terminology, I will call the
former null states and the latter, non-null states. Second, I want to dispel
the impression according to which, in the identification issues raised by (2),
there is a substantial symmetry between the implications on the measure-
ment of probability and the implications on the measurement of utility. For
4
convenience, I will also informally refer to the former as the measurement of
beliefs and the latter, the measurement of desires.
I discuss null states first. Teddy Seidenfeld and co-authors comment
on (2) as follows: “for each coherent system of preferences ≺, the family
of possible (...) probability/utility pairs that agree with ≺ according to ex-
pected utility is constrained solely by probability-0 (null) states” (Seidenfeld
et al., 1990b, p. 521).3 As I now show, the constraint is even weaker than
what this statement suggests.
Assume now that, in (1), p(si∗) = 0 for some i∗ ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Then, (2)





= 0. More generally, with ci∗ any constant from R, the representa-




= ci∗ .4 The key
implication of this simple observation is that, even though p in (1) does not
have full support over S, one can, following (2), construct behaviorally indis-
tinguishable state-dependent representations featuring an alternative prob-
ability q that has full support over S. This is because, in a nutshell, zero
probability values and constant state-dependent utilities are not behaviorally
distinguishable from one another. The upshot is that even the support of
the subjective probability measure is not behaviorally identified.
Of course, given the properties of expected utility, the support of p in (1)
places constraints on the support of any alternative function q in (3). How-
ever, the only property that is common to all the priors q suitably compati-
ble with the preferences given in (1) is the following weak property. For any
3I will eventually return (on p. 20) to the ellipsis in the above quotation.




= 0 for all x ∈ X. All expected utility
levels being preserved, so is the representation. Next, add the constant q(si∗)ci∗ to both
sides of the inequality in (3). The inequality being preserved, so is the representation.
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s ∈ S, if s is non-null, then, q(s) > 0; if s is null, then, q(s) < 1.5 There-
fore, with p the prior featured in the state-independent representation (1),
the constraint characterizing the set of all priors q featured in some state-
dependent alternative representation (3) is as follows: supp(q) ⊇ supp(p).
One notable implication of this characterization is that—however interesting
it may be to conventionally restrict one’s attention to such sets—the set P
of all the priors suitably compatible with the preferences given in (1) is not
a set of mutually absolutely continuous probability measures.6 That is to
say, it is not such that for any pair q, q′ ∈ P and any event E in the event
algebra 2S , if q(E) = 0, then, q′(E) = 0.
Second, Teddy Seidenfeld and co-authors make this other comment on (2):
“it is difficult to justify treating probability values (...) as if they had mean-
ing independently of the utility (...) function. Similarly, the utility function
values do not have meaning independently of the probability of the events”
(Schervish et al., 2013, p. 509). What follows focuses on the second half of
the comment, more specifically, the parallel with the first. From one angle
at least, this parallel is mathematically unquestionable; but it could lead to
misappreciating one thought-provoking asymmetry, which I now highlight.
Consider (1), assuming again, to start with, that there is no null state.
The state-dependent increasing affine transformation in (2) shows that the
beliefs are essentially unidentified. But, in one important respect at least,
it proves inconsequential as far as the identification of desires is concerned.
5In the first case, if q(si) = 0, then for any state-dependent utility function vi it holds
that q(si)vi(x) = 0 for all x ∈ X, while to preserve the representation of the relation
given in (1) with p(si) > 0, it must be that q(si)vi(x) 6= q(si)vi(y) for some x, y ∈ X.
In the second case, if q(si) = 1, then for any state-dependent utility function vi it holds
that q(si)vi(x) 6= q(si)vi(y) for some x, y ∈ X, while to preserve the representation of the
relation given in (1) with p(si) = 0, it must be that q(si)vi(x) = q(si)vi(y) for all x, y ∈ X.
Clearly, the converse of the two implications thus established do not hold; to see this,
consider the case of a constant vi and that of p and q having the same support, respectively.
6This is contrary to what is suggested by some passages in Schervish et al., 1990; 2013,
such as the one quoted at the beginning of this development. The authors are nonetheless
clearly aware of the necessary qualifications (see, e.g., Seidenfeld et al., 1995, p. 2174:
“only when p(si) 6= 0 is it worth restricting Uj in a decomposition of a linear utility V ”).
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Indeed, whatever the collection of state-dependent increasing affine trans-
formations, the consequences and their utility differences (of first or higher
order) will be ranked the same way in all states. Likewise, whenever defined,
the so-called Arrow-Pratt index of risk aversion I(x) ≡ −u′′(x)/u′(x) (see
Arrow, 1963, Pratt, 1964, and, e.g., Eeckhoudt et al., 2005) will be the same
in all states. But, for most decision theorists, this is simply all there is,
in itself, to the measurement of utility. Let me clarify that, in saying so, I
do not mean to endorse a conceptual claim about desires, to the effect that
it would not make sense to even aim at measuring, e.g., utility ratios or,
beyond, absolutely unique utility values. I am merely making a practical ob-
servation about decision theory, according to which, absent any interest for
the joint measurement of subjective probability (or, in a different context,
interpersonal comparisons of utility values), the measurement of utility does
not need to go beyond what is already achieved in (1) and, in fact, preserved
by (2) in (3). Accordingly, in a nutshell, one can claim that, although the
choice data in (1) leaves the underlying beliefs essentially unidentified, it
essentially identifies the underlying desires. This is the promised thought-
provoking asymmetry.7
If there are null states, the claim made above must be qualified by adding
that the contrast which I am highlighting arises only insofar as non-null
states are concerned. This is because, when there are null states, one can
certainly construct state-dependent alternatives to (1) in which the null-
state-dependent transformations will be non-increasing and/or non-affine—
the previously mentioned case of conditionally constant utilities being the
simplest example of all. Accordingly, as far as null states are concerned, the
utility values are entirely unidentified, too. This last point is made clearly
by Teddy Seidenfeld and co-authors (see, e.g., Schervish et al., 1990, p. 840).
7On which see Nau, 2001. Nau draws many other interesting implications from the key
underlying fact here, viz. that up to a standard affine transformation of u, the compound
summands or state-values in (1) are uniquely identified, irrespective of how each of them
is to be further decomposed, state by state, in probability and utility values, respectively.
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Once again, the foregoing qualifications are mere clarifications. Further-
more, overall, the main lesson to draw from (2) is exactly the one which
Teddy Seidenfeld and co-authors forcefully emphasized.8 To wit, the Sav-
age axioms fail to provide subjective probability measures with satisfactory
behavioral foundations because they exclude only some, not all forms of
state-dependent utility. Demonstrably, this is not an accidental failure that
could be fixed by more restrictive variants of these axioms. What (2) really
illustrates is that the assumption of state-independent utility is, at the end of
the day, “ineffable in Savage’s language of preference over acts” (Seidenfeld
et al., 1995, p. 2168–2169). Inasmuch as choosing between Savagian acts is
akin to betting on the state of nature, the same point can also be put by
saying that “state-independent utility (...) cannot be explicated in the lan-
guage of bets” (Seidenfeld et al., 1990b, p. 523). Such general formulations
are also meant to suggest that the problem of state-dependent utility, i.e.,
the identification issues detailed in the present section, is relevant not only
when the existence conditions of representation (1) are satisfied, but more
generally than that. To some extent (which I cannot make precise here),9
the problem challenges any approach—be it a non-expected utility one—that
would seek to explicate beliefs in the language of bets.
2 Act-Dependence
I now turn to the lesser known dimension of act-dependence. I start by recall-
ing how this notion is most often understood. Next, I motivate a generalized
conception of act-dependence, which is the one I am interested in discussing.
Traditionally (see, e.g., Seidenfeld et al., 1990a, p. 143; Seidenfeld et
al., 1990b, p. 521), act-dependence is said to obtain when a representation
like (1) must be replaced by another representation in which, unlike in (1),
8A detailed discussion of this lesson (including concrete interpretations for the forms
of state-dependent utility associated with (2) and the like) is offered in Baccelli, 2017.
9See Baccelli, 2021b for a partial answer and a discussion.
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the probability values assigned to the states depend on the acts under which
the states are envisaged. That is to say, the act-independent probability
measure p : 2S → R of (1) is replaced by a family of act-dependent proba-
bility measures, pf : 2S → R, pg : 2S → R, and the like, so that, for any f
and g ∈ F , (4) holds:
f < g ⇔
n∑
i=1












As Jacques Drèze may have been the first to notice (Drèze, 1961) and Teddy
Seidenfeld and co-authors, among others, subsequently highlighted (see, e.g.,
Seidenfeld et al., 1990a, p. 143), (4) can be naturally interpreted with refer-
ence to the situations of “moral hazard” studied in information economics and
contract theory. For instance, the decision-maker is the agent in a principal–
agent situation, and the probability of the uncertain events of interest—say,
the various levels of profit for the company which she is paid to manage—
depends on the various courses of action which she can take (see, e.g., Hart
and Holmström, 1987; Laffont and Martimort, 2002). More generally, in de-
cision theory, “moral hazard” refers to a varieties of situations in which the
resolution of uncertainty is not exogenous to the agent’s decision-making (or
so she believes), so that the probability of any given state generally depends
on her chosen course of action—i.e., it is act-dependent.
Clearly, if act-dependence is understood as in (4), then, it must fall out of
the scope of this paper, i.e., the Savage axioms are violated. Indeed, although
neither its surface structure nor the above interpretation is the standard one,
(4) falls, observationally and literally speaking, within the class of the “multi-
prior” models, understood generically as the class of all models of individual
decision-making featuring not one, but multiple priors. It is well known that
the multi-prior models, starting with the seminal “maxmin expected utility”
model (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989) or, in an independent tradition, Isaac
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Levi’s decision theory (Levi, 1974; 1980), violate the Savage axioms.10
However, conceptually as well as behaviorally speaking, there is in gen-
eral no good reason for limiting act-dependence to probability, i.e., for not
extending it to utility, too. Intuitively, there are even good reasons against
thus limiting the scope of act-dependence. In a principal–agent situation,
for instance, the agent can influence the probability value of various events,
but at a utility cost—say, the disutility of the various levels of effort which
she will put in her job, depending on the incentive scheme set up by the
principal—that will vary with the courses of action open to her. This is
why one finds at the core of such strategic situations a problem of “incentive
compatibility”, as economists put it. Pushing this line of thought one step
further, one can argue that a genuine act-dependent generalization of (1) will
feature not only a family of act-dependent probability measures, as in (4),
but also a family of act-dependent utility functions, uf : X → R, ug : X → R,
and the like, so that, for any f and g ∈ F , (5) holds:
f < g ⇔
n∑
i=1












Therefore, by analogy with (2) and (3), the following question arises.
Can (1) and (5) ever be equivalent, i.e., can some forms of act-dependence
be behaviorally indistinguishable from the traditional subjective expected
10The above analysis could be sharpened based on the following fact. Most non-expected
utility models can be construed as departing from expected utility exactly in that they op-
erate with act-dependent, rather than act-independent, probability values (see, e.g., Cham-
bers and Echenique, 2016, p. 126; and more fundamentally Cerreia-Vioglio et al., 2011,
Cor. 3). For example, maxmin expected utility is the particular case of (4) where








for some state-independent u over X, and Π a closed,
convex (act-independent) set of priors over 2S .
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utility model axiomatized by Savage?11 The answer is: yes.12 Intuitively,
this happens when, in (5), the act-dependence of probability and the act-
dependence of utility cancel out, in the following sense. Although these two
forms of act-dependence generally entail—be it when they are considered
separately from one another, or when they are considered together—that the
existence conditions of act-independent representation (1) are violated, they
can exceptionally entail, when considered together, that these conditions are
satisfied.
A first case may be found shocking, but should be almost immediate at
this stage. Assume that the existence conditions of representation (1) are
satisfied. Implicit in (2) is the choice of one same alternative full support
measure q for all acts f and g. However, one might as well take an act-
specific full support measure qf for each f . As (6) makes explicit, this will

























The equality in (6) directly establishes that the preferences satisfying the
Savage axioms are compatible not only with the state-independent, act-
independent representation in (1), but also with an infinity of alternative
act- and state-dependent representations. Specifically, the existence condi-
tions of (1) do imply that there must exist an act- and state-independent
representation; but the equality in (6) shows that alternative act- and state-
11I am aware of the fact that, considering decision-making from a first-person and a pre-
scriptive point of view, rather than from the third-person and the descriptive point of view
adopted here, act-dependence raises a different set of questions (see, e.g., Joyce, 1999).
There is no reason to consider these questions as exclusive from the one focused on here.
12To the best of my knowledge, the idea that (4), (5), or the like can be compatible
with (1) has appeared only once before—and rather indirectly—in the literature, namely,
in Drèze and Rustichini, 1999 (Section 5). Drèze and Rustichini’s motivations, assump-
tions, and conclusions, which I cannot present here, are sufficiently different from mine to
justify that I offer the discussion to follow.
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dependent representations exist, too.
Noteworthily, in the alternative representations induced by an equal-
ity like the one in (6), the concavity properties of the act-dependent utility
functions cannot vary across acts, and a form of state-dependent utility must
obtain. To highlight the properties specific to act-dependence, rather than
state-dependence, I now establish that the previously announced positive an-
swer remains correct even when the concavity properties of the act-dependent
utility functions can vary across acts, and no form of state-dependent utility
obtains. To show this, I will build on work recently done, under different
interpretations and with different motivations, by David Dillenberger and
co-authors (Dillenberger et al., 2017).13 Abusing notation as usual, let x
stand for the constant act associating consequence x to all states of na-
ture. Assume from now on that X is (for simplicity) a bounded non-empty
real interval.14 Assume further that, in (1), < is increasing in X (endowed
with the usual order) and such that, for any f ∈ F , there exists one and
only xf ∈ X, called the certainty equivalent of f , such that f ∼ xf . Notice









the certainty equivalent function u−1 represents < in (1), i.e., for any f
and g ∈ F , (7) holds:

















Therefore, to answer positively the question raised in the previous para-
graph, it suffices that, for at least one f ∈ F , some act-dependent pair
13David Dillenberger and co-authors do not discuss moral hazard, a particular form of
which is behaviorally indistinguishable from what they call “optimism”. Besides, because
their focus is different, they provide an analysis of act-dependence that is less detailed than
the one offered in the present paper. Finally, as the end of the present paper will make
clear, their suggested analysis of the links between act-dependence and state-dependence
(Dillenberger et al., 2017, fn. 14, p. 1171) is, in several important respects, incomplete.
14This is typically the case in the axiomatizations of subjective expected utility over a
finite state space (see fn. 1), so as to make the uniqueness of the representation tractable.
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Two preference relations characterized by the same certainty equivalent func-
tion being one and the same, it will then follow that, when it is thus con-
structed, (5) is equivalent to (1).
I start by merely stating how to find, for any f ∈ F , a pair (pf , uf ) satis-
fying (8). For non-triviality, I will focus throughout on non-constant acts.15
For concreteness, I will focus on finding a pair (pf , uf ) such that pf dis-
plays the following remarkable property: The lottery induced by pf over the
consequences of f puts more probability weight on the more preferred con-
sequences than the lottery similarly induced by p. That is to say, calling p̂f
and p̂ the former and the latter lottery, respectively, p̂f first-order stochasti-
cally dominates p̂. Such cases are of interest because, as first-order stochastic
dominance is sufficient, ceteris paribus, for a greater expected utility, they
most immediately fit (through the idea of a utility cost) the intuitions coming
from the moral hazard cases studied in economics. Now, pick any increasing
concave transformation hf , and define uf by uf ≡ hf ◦ u. Then, it can be
shown that, for any uf thus defined, there exists at least one pf satisfying (8)
and the above first-order stochastic dominance requirement. It is the prob-
ability measure pf that, under the constraint given in (8), minimizes the
Euclidean distance to p, i.e., the expression in (9):







To the best of my present understanding, minimizing the Euclidean distance
to p has no particularly straightforward decision-theoretic interpretation in
15Notice that, by the defining properties of certainty equivalent functions, if f is con-
stant, then, whatever the function uf , there is no constraint on pf in (8).
13
our context, and it may be considered as playing a merely technical role
in my analysis. The concave transform uf of u, by contrast, can be rather
naturally interpreted as integrating the utility cost paid by the decision-
maker for her efforts resulting in the initial distribution p̂ being replaced by
the more advantageous distribution p̂f . In any case, the special twist of the
situation thus constructed is that the two changes offset one another, in the
sense that (8) holds.
When |S| = 2, the proof of the existence claim just made is almost
immediate. Specifically, when f(s1) 6= f(s2), for a given increasing trans-
formation hf , only one probability measure pf satisfies (8). The solution
being unique, it is also, trivially, the distance-minimizing solution. Besides,
the concavity of hf directly imposes that p̂f first-order stochastically domi-
nates p̂. Call this Proposition 1, a proof of which is provided in the Appendix.
When |S| ≥ 3, by contrast, the situation is of necessity more complex.
For a given hf , there is typically not just one distribution, but a convex set
of measures satisfying (8). By the continuity in probability of the expected
utility functional and the fact that any probability measure is in principle
eligible to be pf , this set is not empty. I will be content here with analyz-
ing the case where |S| = 3 and f is such that f(s1) 6= f(s2) 6= f(s3), with,
say, f(s1) > f(s2) > f(s3). This is an enlightening case to focus on because
the main intuitions, that apply beyond this setting, can then be conveyed
geometrically in the so-called Marschak-Machina triangle. Presented as per-
tains to the present analysis, this is the simplex representing all the lot-
teries over the outcome set {f(s1), f(s2), f(s3)}, wherein each lottery q is













the probability weight it places on outcomes f(s1) and f(s3), respectively
(see Marschak, 1950, Machina, 1982, and, e.g., the survey in Sugden, 2004).
Assuming some familiarity with this probability triangle and the geomet-


















Figure 1: Act-dependence in the Marschak-Machina triangle
As illustrated in Fig. 1, p̂ corresponds to some point within the triangle
(or on one of its boundaries). Given our assumptions and the properties of
expected utility, the convex set of probability measures satisfying (8)—i.e.,
yielding with uf xf , the observed certainty equivalent of f—must appear
in the triangle as a line with some positive slope. By concavity, this line
cannot pass by p̂ or any point located southeast of p̂, i.e., any lottery that
is first-order stochastically dominated by p̂. Therefore, this line must pass
somewhere above p̂. Because this line has positive slope, its intercept with
the perpendicular passing by p̂ (or, if this intercept lies strictly out of the
triangle, the closest intercept of the line with one of the boundaries of the
triangle) must lie somewhere northwest of p̂, i.e., correspond to a lottery
that first-order stochastically dominates p̂. In other words, given a concave
transform uf of u, if pf satisfies (8) and minimizes the distance to p as defined
in (9), then, p̂f first-order stochastically dominates p̂. Call this Proposition 2,
15
the algebraic proof of which is sketched in the Appendix.16
Here is an illustration of what the preceding analysis implies. Suppose for
concreteness that |S| = 3, X = [0, 100], and consider the two acts in Table 1.
s1 s2 s3
f 49 25 1
g 2 2 32
Table 1: Two Savagian acts
With reference to f and g in Table 1, consider a decision-maker whose prefer-
ences over f , g, and the like can be represented as in (1). Further assume that,















(1/5, 3/5, 1/5). Thus, we have that f  g and the certainty equivalents
of f and g are 25 and 8, respectively. However, notice that the same
certainty equivalents are observed with uf (x) =
√




























= (0, 1/2, 1/2), respectively. The two
act-dependent probability measures have been computed following the con-
struction geometrically presented in Fig. 1. Together with the act-dependent
utility functions based on which the computations have been made, they pro-
vide a concrete illustration of the possible equivalence between (1) and (5).
Clearly, the compatibility between (1) and (5) generalizes to any number
of states and any number of acts. It also generalizes to convex transforma-
tions of u together with act-dependent probability measures inducing distri-
butions that are first-order stochastically dominated by p̂, to pairs (uf , pf )
such that uf is neither more concave nor more convex than u and p̂f is neither
first-order stochastically dominating nor first-order stochastically dominated
16David Dillenberger and co-authors sketch the geometric analysis of Fig. 1, but they
do not provide the complementary algebraic analysis presented for the case |S| = 3 in the
Appendix. (The general case |S| = n can be proved following a constrained optimization
analysis.)
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by p̂, and to still other cases. These other cases might less immediately fit
the intuitions coming from the moral hazard literature, than the case in
Fig. 1. However, importantly, they are equally compelling illustrations of
the fact that some forms of act-dependence are behaviorally indistinguishable
from the subjective expected utility model axiomatized by Savage. More-
over, their sheer variety, especially as regards the concavity properties of
the act-dependent utility functions across all acts, is informative. It makes
transparent that—whatever either of the following means at this level of
intricacy—neither the beliefs nor the desires of the decision-maker are inter-
estingly identified across all the admissible act-dependent representations of
a given subjective expected utility relation. Notice that the second half of
this conclusion contrasts with what has been previously explained to hold
across all the admissible state-dependent representations of that relation (see
p. 7).
Two general lessons can be drawn from the fact that (1) and (5) thus
prove compatible with one another. The first and, perhaps, main lesson can
be phrased so as to echo how Teddy Seidenfeld and co-authors phrase (in
the quotations given on p. 8) the main lesson to draw from the equivalence
between (1) and (3). Preferences satisfying the Savage axioms are compati-
ble not only with the traditional expected utility representation in (1), but
also with an infinity of “multi-prior expected multi-utility” representations
displaying the special structure in (5), and (in at least some cases) rather
naturally associated with the moral hazard interpretation introduced at the
beginning of this section.17 This is because the Savage axioms—starting
with P2, that is the main axiom supposed to enforce act-independence in
the Savage axiomatics—exclude only some, not all forms of act-dependence.
17Although its usage is typically more specialized, I freely borrow the phrase “multi-
prior expected multi-utility representation” from the literature on incomplete preferences
(see, e.g., Galaabaatar and Karni, 2013 and the references therein, including Seidenfeld et
al., 1995). Observationally and literally speaking, this is justified inasmuch as (5) features
multiple probability measures and multiple utility functions.
17
And this, in turn, is because the requirement that representation (1) be act-
independent is partly “ineffable in Savage’s language of preference over acts”.
In other words, it cannot be fully “explicated in the language of bets”. Such
general language is also meant to suggest that the problem of act-dependence,
i.e., the identification issues explored in the present section, is relevant not
only when the existence conditions of representation (1) are satisfied, but
more generally than that.
Second, and perhaps most interestingly, the fact that (1) and (5) prove
compatible has implications on the problem of state-dependent utility, i.e.,
the identification issues presented in Section 1, and its relation to the prob-
lem of act-dependence. Remarkably, it has been suggested in the literature
that, for the problem of state-dependent utility to be solved, it suffices that
the decision-maker presumes that she has some influence on the realization
of the events, the likelihood of which she is betting upon (see, especially,
Drèze, 1987; Karni, 2011). However, the possible equivalence between (1)
and (5) makes it clear that, in general, this will not suffice.18 Indeed, this
equivalence means that there will be some cases of the following kind. The
decision-maker does presume that she has such capacity of influence, which
is one natural interpretation of (at least some instances of) (5); but the
observer of her betting behavior is brought back to square one, i.e., repre-
sentation (1), that is, based on equality (2), behaviorally indistinguishable
from representation (3).
Moreover, it is not just indirectly, i.e., through its equivalence with (1),
that (5) leads back to the identification issues raised by state-dependent
utility. Indeed (even without once again mentioning the cases immediately
covered by equality (6)), notice that whatever the act f , for any full sup-
18For an elaboration on this non-sufficiency, see Baccelli, 2021a, Sec. 3. Admittedly,
both Drèze and Karni are well aware of the fact that, with actions that are unequally
costly to the agent, moral hazard may not suffice to overcome the challenges posed by
state-dependent utility to the behavioral identification of beliefs. However, neither points
out let alone elaborates on the fact that this is even compatible with the respect of the
Savage axioms.
18












i = 1, . . . , n, equality (10) holds:
n∑
i=1























Therefore, when (1) and (5) are equivalent (with potentially different concav-
ity properties, across all acts, for the various act-dependent utility functions),
we also have through (10) that, for any f and g ∈ F , (11) holds:
f < g ⇔
n∑
i=1












However obvious they should be at this stage of the analysis, equality
(10) and equivalence (11) are worth expliciting because they make the fol-
lowing fact clear. Even holding fixed the act-dependent concavity properties
of the utility side of an act-dependent representation, the probability side
is not behaviorally identified. More generally, what equality (10) shows is
that the possible equivalence between (1) and (3) generalizes to any act-
dependent variant of (1) and the induced variant of (3). Likewise, the pos-
sible equivalence between (1) and (5) generalizes to any state-dependent
variant of (1) and the induced variant of (5). Thus (and even more so
given the cases already immediately covered by (6)), the state-dependence
and act-dependence identification issues examined in this paper do not can-
cel out, but combine with one another. Consequently, the respect of the
Savage axioms proves compatible with an infinity of state-dependent and
act-dependent representations. Metaphorically speaking, state-dependence
and act-dependence form two dimensions along which one can find infinitely
many admissible representations of the same Savage preference relation.
Incidentally, the above analysis offers a full clarification for what Teddy
19
Seidenfeld and co-authors likely refer to when they mention—now without
the ellipsis, unlike in the first occurrence of this quotation on p. 5—“the fam-
ily of possible (act-independent) probability/utility pairs that agree with ≺
according to expected utility” (Seidenfeld et al., 1990b, p. 521; my emphasis).
Conclusion
In this paper, I have discussed the uniqueness clause of the Savage theorem.
I have kept referring to Savage’s result simply because it is the prime exam-
ple of its kind in axiomatic decision theory; for my purposes, all the essential
conclusions reached by examining this theorem are equally relevant to Ram-
sey’s, de Finetti’s, or Anscombe and Aumann’s alternative approaches, to
mention but a few. Throughout the paper, I have assumed that the ex-
istence conditions of Savage’s theorem are satisfied. I have also, in effect,
held fixed one arbitrary set of choice data meeting this requirement. I have
shown that, contrary to what is usually held, there is not just one (the
possible scales for the measurement of utility), but three dimensions along
which the non-uniqueness of the representation of the data must be appre-
ciated. The two usually neglected dimensions are that of state-dependence
and act-dependence. The latter dimension is, by far, the most unexplored
of the two in the current literature; this justifies the greater detail in which
it has been presented, as well as the greater caution with which it has been
discussed. The existence of these two additional dimensions has especially
damaging consequences on the behavioral identification of subjective proba-
bility, which the Savage theorem is supposed to deliver.
I have particularly emphasized the symmetries, asymmetries, and con-
nections between state-dependence and act-dependence. But upon finishing,
I want to specifically highlight that, although state-dependence and act-
dependence are often—which to some extent includes, by its very construc-
tion, the present paper—put on a par, they are profoundly different from
20
one another. This would become even more apparent if one stopped assum-
ing that the existence conditions of the classical subjective expected utility
representation are satisfied and started investigating which of the Savage
axioms are violated by the forms of state-dependence and act-dependence
that are incompatible with that representation. The question is especially
interesting when both forms of dependence are allowed to obtain at the
same time. Given the limited work currently available on act-dependence in
axiomatic, behavioral, Savage-style decision theory, such investigation will
require further research.
Appendix
PROPOSITION 1: Assume that |S| = 2 and f(s1) 6= f(s2). For any concave
transform uf of u, there is one and only one pf that satisfies constraint (8),
and it is such that p̂f first-order stochastically dominates p̂.
Proof of Proposition 1
Given the definition uf ≡ hf ◦ u and the properties of function composi-
tion, (8) can be uniquely solved as detailed next. For brevity, in this proof,


































































































hf (u1)− hf (u2)
.
It is readily checked that pf (s1) ∈ [0, 1], so that the solution defines a prob-
ability measure. Next, assume without loss of generality that f(s1) > f(s2).
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Jensen’s inequality and the solution given above for pf (s1) imply that p̂f first-
































hf (u1)− hf (u2)
⇔ pf (s1) +
hf (u2)
hf (u1)− hf (u2)
> p(s1) +
hf (u2)
hf (u1)− hf (u2)
√
⇔ pf (s1) > p(s1).

PROPOSITION 2: Assume that |S| = 3 and f(s1) 6= f(s2) 6= f(s3). For any
concave transform uf of u, if pf minimizes (9) under constraint (8), then,
pf is such that p̂f first-order stochastically dominates p̂.
Proof of Proposition 2










































































I start with the following preliminary observation. Given a (strictly)
concave hf , p̂f cannot satisfy (8) and be first-order stochastically dominated
by p̂. Assume, by way of contradiction, that such is the case. Then, by the






























. By the concavity of hf , we also have


































dicting (8). Similarly, in Fig. 1, the line on which p̂f is to be found cannot















= hf (p̂1u1+ p̂2u2+ p̂3u3), while concavity requires that
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Next, without loss of generality, assume that u1 > u2 > u3, as in Fig. 1.
Then, p̂f first-order stochastically dominates p̂ if and only if p̂f1 ≥ p̂1 and
p̂f1 + p̂
f
2 ≥ p̂1 + p̂2, with one of these inequalities being strict. Because, as
explained in the preliminary observation, it is excluded that p̂ first-order
stochastically dominates p̂f , it remains to be shown that if p̂f1 ≥ p̂1 (respec-
tively, p̂f1 + p̂
f
2 ≥ p̂1 + p̂2) and the minimal Euclidean distance condition is
satisfied, then, p̂f1 + p̂
f
2 ≥ p̂1 + p̂2 (respectively, p̂
f
1 ≥ p̂1). I now show, by




2 < p̂1 + p̂2, then, the minimal Eu-
clidean distance condition is not satisfied. (The other case is similar.) With
reference to Fig. 1, this amounts to showing that, if one picks a point r,
corresponding to p̂f , that is on the line and northeast of p̂, then, one can
always find another point r′ that is also on the line, but closer—as measured
by the Euclidean distance (adapted from measures over the algebra of events
to lotteries over the set of consequences in the obvious way)—to p̂.
I now show how to construct r′ from r. As is clear from Fig. 1 and as I
now detail algebraically, in general, this can be done by transferring to f(s2)
appropriately small probability weights ε1, ε3 from f(s1) and f(s3), respec-




2 < p̂1 + p̂2 and (ii) as
explained in the preliminary observation, p̂ cannot first-order stochastically
dominate p̂f , it must be not only that p̂f1 ≥ p̂1, but more specifically that
p̂f1 > p̂1; hence, that p̂
f
1 > 0. Second, notice that if it also holds that p̂
f
3 > 0,



















































assuming p̂f3 > 0 still, consider the Euclidean distance between p̂ and r
and r′, respectively, defining it like in (9). For commodity, examine more
specifically the squared Euclidean distances, denoting them by dr and dr′ ,
respectively. Notice that, by (9), we have that:
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dr′ − dr= ε21 + 2ε1(p̂1 − p̂
f
1) + (ε1 + ε3)










ε1 + 2(p̂1 − p̂f1)
)
+ (ε1 + ε3)
(


































































)) ε1 − 2((p̂1 + p̂2)− (p̂f1 + p̂f2))
)
.
Therefore, to have dr′ − dr < 0, i.e., to find a point r′ on the line but at a
lesser Euclidean distance to p̂ than point r, it suffices to pick any ε1 such
that the following two conditions are satisfied:
1. ε1 < 2(p̂
f
1 − p̂1) ≡ α;

















))((p̂1 + p̂2)− (p̂f1 + p̂f2)) ≡ β.




2 < p̂1 + p̂2 hold by
assumption; (ii) for the reasons previously detailed, not only p̂f1 ≥ p̂1, but














by assumption. Thus, if p̂f3 > 0, any ε1 ∈ (0,min{α;β}) will define a point r′
that, like r, satisfies (8), while generating, by (9), a lesser distance than r.
If p̂f3 = 0, there is no need to preliminarily express ε3 in terms of ε1, and
one may directly compare the relevant squared Euclidean distances simply
by setting ε3 = 0 in the preceding equalities; then, with α as defined above,
any ε1 ∈ (0, α) has the desired properties. This establishes in all cases that




2 < p̂1 + p̂2, then, the minimal
Euclidean distance condition is not satisfied. By contraposition, under con-
straint (8), if p̂f1 ≥ p̂1 and the minimal Euclidean distance condition is satis-
fied, then, p̂f1 + p̂
f
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